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I. Introduction 
 
                     
    
1
  This is a revised version of the paper presented at the Paris 
conference in 1992. It draws heavily on, and extends the analysis 
of, Singh [1993]. 
 
An outstanding feature of the world financial economy during the 
last decade or so has been the establishment and the very fast 
expansion of stock markets in developing countries. Between 1982 
and 1992 the  total   combined capitalisation  of  companies 
quoted on  the  emerging  markets included  in  the IFC list rose 
from less  than  hundred  billion dollars  to nearly  a trillion 
U.S. dollars.   The  corresponding growth   in the combined 
capitalisation of  industrial  countries market was a little more 
than three fold - from three trillion to ten  trillon  U.S. 
dollars.   A  number  of  leading individual  emerging markets 
(e.g. Mexico, Korea, Thailand) recorded more than twenty fold 
increase in total market capitalisation of companines quoted on 
the stock exchanges. By the early 1990's capitalisation of many 
emerging markets, whether considered in absolute terms or as  a 
proportion of GDP, was greater than that of  medium  sized 
advanced  countries  markets in Europe (e.g. Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland).   
 
It will be recalled that in the General Theory, Keynes was stringent 
in his criticism of the role of the stockmarket in relation to 
industrial investment and the real economy. In a famous passage, 
in chapter 12 he wrote:"As the organisation of investment markets 
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improves, the risk of the predominance of speculation does, however, 
increase. In one of the greatest investment markets in the world, 
namely, New York, the influence of speculation (in the above sense, 
ie. 'the activity of forecasting the psychology of the market')is 
enormous. ... Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady 
stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise 
becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital 
development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities 
of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done." 
 
That was of course yesterday. Today the stockmarkets are the 'toast 
of the town'. New ones are being established and existing ones being 
expanded by  developing  countries around the globe - from  the 
least developed countries like Tanzania and Nepal to, as 
seen  above, the most advanced of the industrilizing economies like 
Korea  and Taiwan. Despite the huge stock market scam in India in 
1992, almost every important city in the country, either already 
has or aspires to have a stock exchange. Interestingly, stock 
markets are being favoured, not just by the Bretton Woods 
institutions (as one would expect), but also in heterodox circles. 
For example, a WIDER Study Group in Helsinki in its 1990 report 
strongly recommended the establishment of such markets in poor 
countries in order to attract portfolio investment funds from rich 
countries.  
 
More significantly, the communist government in China is fast 
expanding stock markets. In his Report to the 13th Congress of the 
  
 
 3 
Chinese Communist Party in 1988, the then General Secretary of the 
party Zhao Zhi Yang provided an ideological justification for the 
use of the stock market by a socialist economy.  He suggested that 
during the `primary state of socialism', and the `commodity 
production' stages of the development of a socialist economy, it 
is necessary to use various market forms including the stock market. 
 Zhao argued that such institutions should not simply be regarded 
as a preserve of  capitalism: socialism should also take advantage 
of them whilst minimising their harmful effects
2
. 
 
Notwithstanding this almost universal enthusiasm in third world 
countries for stock markets, it is important to be cautious about 
the role of these markets in economic development. This is not just 
because of Keynes' strictures above. More importantly there is very 
considerable concern today in the US and the UK themselves - 
countries where stock markets are more advanced and reign supreme 
- about the negative effects of these markets on these nations' 
competitiveness vis-a-vis countries like Germany and Japan (where 
equity markets have historically been far less significant in 
relation to industrial development). A growing number of economists 
and industrialists in both the US and the UK believe that stock 
market - based economies are at a competitive disadvantage in 
relation to Germany and Japan which have bank based financial 
systems. Stock markets, it is contended, lead inevitably to 
short-termism. They tend to become vehicles for short-term gains 
                     
    
2
  For a full discussion of the role of the stock market in 
a socialist economy, see Singh [1990]. 
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(through, for example, leverage buy-outs and hostile takeovers), 
rather than promoting long-term investment.  
 
Professor Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School, reporting 
recently on the results of a large research project on various 
aspects of the US financial system, voices these concerns as 
follows: "..the change in nature of competition and the increasing 
pressure of globalization make investment the most critical 
determinant of competetive advantage. ... Yet the US system of 
allocating investment capital both within and across companies is 
failing. This puts American companies at a serious disadvantage 
in global competition and ultimately threatens the long term growth 
of the US economy."
3
 
 
In view of these contradictory assessments of the role of the stock 
market for competitiveness and long term investment and innovation, 
it is essential for the developing countries before they go too 
far in this direction to ask how precisely do the stock markets 
help in the industrialisation process.  Specifically, the 
following issues need careful investigation.   
(a) What are the channels through which the establishment of 
a stock market fosters economic and industrial 
development in a country? 
 
                     
    
3
  Porter [1992a, p.65]. This paper reports the findings of 
a large research project sponsored by the Harvard Business School 
and the Council on Competitiveness, a project that included 18 
research papers by 25 academic experts.) 
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(b) How well do such channels operate in practice in countries which 
have well functioning stock markets? 
 
(c) How are stock markets likely to function in the particular 
circumstances of developing countries? 
 
(d) If stock market are established, can the developing countries 
avoid their negative effects as Zhao Zhi Yang was suggesting? 
  
 
(e) Are there feasible alternatives to stock market-based financial 
systems?  Will the developing countries be better off with 
such alternatives systems?   
 
Following sections will attempt to shed light on some of these 
issues. 
 
II. The Stock Market and Economic and Industrial Development: The 
Channels of Transmission: Theories and Evidence4 
In principle a well functioning stock market may help the 
development process in an economy through the following means:
5
  
1. Growth of savings and investments 
2. Efficient allocation of investment resources 
3. Better utilisation of the existing resources and an    
increase in the productivity of investment 
                     
    
4
 The discussion in this section draws on my paper Singh, 1990. 
    
5
 See for example Baumol [1966], Cho [1986], Stiglitz [1991], 
Singh [1971, 1992]. 
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These three developmental tasks are performed on the stock market 
by essentially two kinds of market mechanisms: the pricing process 
and the take-over mechanism.  The important question is how well 
do these mechanisms work in practice and how successfully are the 
above functions in fact performed in the real world.  We shall first 
consider here analysis and evidence in relation to the fully 
developed stock markets of advanced economies 
 
There is a voluminous literature on this subject, but our discussion 
here will inevitably be brief and concentrate only on the essential 
points.
6
 The stock market may encourage savings in developing 
countries by providing households with an additional instrument 
which may better meet their risk preferences and liquidity needs. 
 Moreover, share ownership provides individuals with a relatively 
liquid means of sharing risk in investment projects. 
This  may  help  raise the rate of  investment in  the 
economy  by  enabling  investment  projects  to  be undertaken 
collectively which otherwise may not have occured at all.   In 
practice however, evidence from well developed stock markets 
indicates that the does not market perform this savings function 
at all satisfactorily .  As Mayer's [1990] analysis of flows of 
funds data for several industrial countries on a comparable basis 
 over the period 1970 to 1985 shows, the equity market's net 
contribution to investment needs of the non-financial corporate 
                     
    
6
  For a recent revue article on the subject, see Hughes and 
Singh [1990]. 
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sectors both in the US and the UK was negative over this period. 
 What this indicates is that corporate new issues in these two 
countries were more than matched by a net redemption of corporate 
shares (mainly because of takeovers).  In other industrial 
countries, although new issues made a net positive contribution 
to corporate investment over the period considered, it was extremely 
small and amounted to no more than 2 to 3 per cent of the total. 
  
 
Mayer's data also indicates that in all countries the main source 
of corporate finance is ` retain earnings'.  To the extent that the 
companies use external funds to finance their investment needs, 
in almost all countries, except the UK, bank finance is by far the 
most important source of outside funds.     
  
It  is  important to observe that  although  the  above empirical 
results  undermine the savings function of  the  stock market, 
from a theoritical stand point , they are not surprising. Thus, 
whether  or not domestic savings will be enhanced  by  the 
institution of the stock market depeneds in theory on the utility 
function of the household (Pagano 1993). Since the  stock market 
transaction  cost that otherwise help improve the  efficiency  of 
savings  instruments,  some households may be  able  reach  their 
savings targets by doing less savings than before. Moreover,  the 
pattern of corporate financing observed by Mayer for the advanced 
countries - in which the firms seem to prefer retain earnings  to 
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debt,  and both these to new issues ( so called " pecking  order" 
pattern  of   finance) is  compatible  with   rational   profit  
maximisation by the  firm.  Current models of corporate  finance, 
based  on  theories  of  assysmetric  information,  agency  cos
t, transaction  cost  etc. can rationalise the "  pecking  order" 
in terms of normal profit maximisation by firms without invoking 
any managerial theories of firm (Myers 1984). 
 
The pricing of shares is critical to how well can the stock market 
perform the  allocative functions.  An efficient pricing process 
will reward the well managed and profitable firms by valuing their 
shares more highly than those of unsuccessful and unprofitable 
firms.  This mechanism lowers the cost of capital to the former 
and hence ensures a greater allocation of new investment resource 
to such firms at the expense of the latter group of firms who 
correspondingly face a higher cost of capital.  Thus relative share 
prices of firms in an `efficient' pricing system should reflect 
their relative expected profitability. 
 
Tobin [1984] has made a useful distinction between two concepts 
of  efficiency of share prices: the `fundamental valuation' 
efficiency and the ` information arbitrage' efficiency.  The latter 
refers to how quickly all available information is disseminated 
throughout the market and is incorporated in share prices; the 
former concept refers to the notion of efficiency outlined in the 
previous paragraph. Although there are well known anamolies there 
is considerable evidence from advanced country stock markets which 
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indicates that share prices on these markets are "weakly" efficient 
in the ` information arbitrage' sense: all new information is fairly 
quickly reflected in share prices.
7
  There is however far less 
evidence which suggests that actual prices which prevail on the 
London or New York  stock exchanges are `efficient' from a point 
of view of fundamental valuation, i.e. that relative share prices 
of corporations always reflect their true long term expected 
earnings.  Many empirical studies have called attention to myopia, 
fads, and the domination of stock market prices by short term 
considerations.
8
  It is the influence of short termism and 
speculators on the stock market that had led Keynes in the General 
Theory to liken the stock market to a gambling casino. 
 
Although "efficient" prices in the fundamental valuation sense are 
a necessary condition for the stock market to perform its 
developmental tasks, they are not sufficient.  Sufficiency 
requires in addition, the existence of an `efficient' takeover 
mechanism which can ensure that all those companies whose 
profitability under their existing managements was lower than what 
it could be under any other management, were acquired by the latter. 
 For large management controlled oligopolistic corporations in 
capitalist economies, for which the natural selection process on 
                     
    
7
  See the contributions to the "Symposium on Bubbles" in the 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol 4(2), 1990. 
    
8
  See for example Shiller [1981]; Modigliani and Cohen [1979]; 
Poterba and Summers [1988]; Smith, Suchaneck and Arlington [1988]; 
Nickell and Wadhwani [1987].  For a careful recent review of the 
burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature in this area see 
Camerer [1989]. 
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the product markets may not work, the takeover mechanism is the 
only effective marked-based disciplinary device.
9
  However, modern 
theorists of the firm and industrial organisation have argued in 
recent contributions that for a number of powerful reasons (e.g. 
the transactions costs, the `free rider' problem), even in 
principle, the takeover device may not work effectively despite 
the fact that the pricing process of the stock market were 
"efficient. 
10
 
 
More significantly, empirical studies of the actual nature of the 
take- over selection process on the stock market show that contrary 
to the folklore of capitalism, in general it is not the case that 
only the unprofitable companies are taken over, or that greater 
the profitability (or the stock market valuation) of a company, 
the correspondingly lower its chances of acquisition.  Evidence 
from a wide range of studies for the UK, the US and other industrial 
countries indicate that the take-over selection takes place only 
to a very limited degree on the basis of profitability; it does 
so much more in terms of the size of the company.  A large, 
relatively unprofitable company has a much greater change of being 
immune from take over than a much more profitable but a small 
company.  In fact, in the real world stock markets, making an 
acquisition to increase size might itself become a tactic to avoid 
take over.  (Greer, 1986; Singh, 1971). 
                     
    
9
  There is a large literature on the subject. For a recent 
review article see Singh [1992]. 
    
10
 See for example Grossman and Hart [1980]; Stiglitz [1985]. 
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If we turn from the question of what kinds of companies are taken 
over on the stock market and by whom to that of what happens to 
resource  use following takeover, the empirical evidence is no more 
reassuring.  In addition to their disciplinary role, takeovers also 
provide an important mechanism in a capitalist economy for the 
reorganisation of the capital resources of the society in response 
to changing technology, tastes, and market conditions.  However 
a wide range of empirical studies comparing pre - and post merger 
profitability indicate that, on average, the profitability of 
merging firms does not improve after merger.  To the extent that 
monopoly power of the acquiring company in the product market may 
increase as a consequence of takeover, this evidence is compatible 
with reduced efficiency in resource utilisation following 
mergers.
11
 
 
If the post-merger outcome of the amalgamation process is considered 
in terms of the effect on share prices (rather than on the accounting 
rates of return), the results of empirical studies suggest that 
the shareholders of the victims invariably gain as a consequence 
of takeover (due to the bid premia) whilst those of the acquirers 
do not.  These bid premia on taken over companies are regarded by 
economists who believe in the `efficiency' of the stock market 
pricing and takeover processes, as indicators of unrealised 
long-term efficiency gains.  It is however, more natural to think 
of them as arising from the ` dual valuation' situation which exists 
                     
    
11
  See Singh [1971, 75, 93]; Meeks [1977]; Mueller [1980]. 
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on the stock market in relation to takeovers (Charkham, 1988; 
Plender, 1990): one is the normal day-to-day valuation of a small 
number of a company's shares which may be traded and reflects 
valuation at the margin; the other is the valuation for the control 
of the company as a whole when intra-marginal holders have to be 
bought out (Hughes, 1989).  The differences between these two 
valuations provide enormous opportunities for predators, 
speculators and others who may gain simply putting a ` company into 
play' regardless of the economic and industrial logic of the 
acquisition.
12
 
 
To sum up the above analysis suggests that even with well organised 
and complex stock markets such as those which exist in the US and 
the UK, the stock market is unable to perform its disciplinary and 
allocative tasks at all well; nor is it conspicuously successful 
in promoting savings.  However the fact that the stock markets may 
not confer much benefit on the advanced countries does not mean 
that their influence is nevertheless generally benign or at least 
harmless.  As noted in Section I, there are good analytical reasons 
for the view that  the active role which the stock markets play 
in the US and the UK may actually be damaging to these economies. 
 This theme will be explored in the next section by comparing the 
characteristics and experience of the Anglo-saxon economies with 
those of Japan and Germany where the stock market for historical 
                     
    
12
 For a fuller discussion of the diffrences between the merger 
studies based on accouting and share price data see Caves (1989), 
Scherer (    ), Singh (1993). 
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reasons has traditionally had very little influence on industrial 
development. 
 
III.  The Stock Market, Takeovers and International 
Competitiveness: The Financial Systems in the US and the UK Versus 
West Germany and Japan 
 
An active market for corporate control with its corollary of hostile 
takeovers is today a central feature of the finance-industry 
relationships in the stock market dominated economies of the US 
and the UK.  However the relationships between finance and industry 
are rather differently organised in Japan and West Germany.  In 
these countries there is a far greater role for the banks who tend 
to have a long term relationship with industrial corporations.  
There is also a rather different status for the shareholders and 
the stock market in general than in the Anglo-Saxon economies.  
Both in Japan and West Germany hostile takeovers are virtually 
absent.   
 
As Mr. Kazuo Nukazawa, a managing director of Keidanren (the 
Japanese employers federation) explains: 
 
`Ours is not the rugged or brutal capitalism of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century.  When good management today 
involves not just production and sales but also 
integration with the corporate and social environment, 
a takeover objected to by such "stake-holders" is doomed 
to fail in the long run.
13
    
                     
    
13
  Quoted in Cosh, Hughes and Singh [1990]. 
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In the Japanese scheme of things, the shareholders are placed a 
`distant last', behind almost everyone else who has dealings with 
the company — the so-called stake-holders.14  The latter include 
managers, employees, creditors, banks, customers and suppliers and, 
if the company is a part of a large group, the parent company.  
Takeovers cannot be successfully completed without the consent of 
the significant stake-holders in each case. 
 
In Germany also the incidence of hostile takeovers is very low. 
 Moreover, the size of the German stock market is relatively small; 
the ratio of marker capitalisation to GDP is about 25 per cent in 
Germany as compared to 80 per cent in Japan, 85 per cent in the 
UK, and 87 per cent in the US.  Of around 400 companies quoted on 
the German stock markets only about 30 have shares which are actively 
traded (the other companies being closely held and therefore much 
less subject to a takeover threat).   
 
Some recent academic research on both sides of the Atlantic links 
the competitive failure of the Anglo-saxon economies (relative to 
those of Japan and Germany, for example) to the differences in the 
operation of the market for corporate control and other features 
of the financial systems of these countries. 
At  the  simplest  level  the  argument is that the existence of 
a highly active market for corporate control,  with its hostile 
take-overs and leveraged buy-outs oblidges the  U.S. and the U.K 
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 See the Economist, 29 April, 1989. 
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managers to pay close attention to their earnings  per 
share  performances  every  quarter or every  six  months. This 
forces  them  to become "short-termist" in their outlook  and  to 
sacrifice long term useful investments at the altar of short term 
earnings.
15
   
A related point is made in the recent MIT Commission Report on U.S. 
industrial productivity (MIT, 1989), which suggests that U.S. 
industries have lost out to the Japanese not because Japanese wages 
are relatively low, but because the relative cost of capital and 
the threshold rate of return in Japan are much lower.  The 
Commission gives examples of a number of American markets where 
Japanese have come in, accepted a very low rate of return, while 
the American companies have diversified and left those markets, 
since they could not accept such low returns. Japanese  companies 
are able to sustain such low  rates of return for prolonged periods 
because they are not subject  to the constant  take-over threat 
of the kind  which  the  American  
firms have to endure. 
 
The Japanese and also the West German financial systems, which are 
bank rather than stock-market-dominated, are thus on this analysis 
regarded as being much more conducive to the development of the 
real economy and to international competitiveness.  This modern 
thesis connects with an influential earlier analysis by economic 
historians, such as Gerschenkron [1962], Cameron [1967] and others, 
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 See for example Cosh, Hughes and Singh [1990]; Frank and 
Mayer [1990]; Berger et.al [1989]. For a fuller discussion of the 
relationship between takeovers and short-termism see Singh [1993a]. 
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who called attention to the critical role of the banks in initiating 
and fostering industrial development during the last century in 
Germany, France and Japan. 
 
Keynes observed in the General Theory: `the spectacle of modern 
investment markets has sometimes moved me towards the conclusion 
that to make the purchase of an investment permanent and 
indissoluble, like marriage, except by reason of death or other 
great cause, might be a useful remedy for our contemporary evils. 
 For this would forced the investor to direct his mind to the long 
term prospects and to those only' (chapter 12).  Characteristically 
Keynes puts his finger on a central analytical weakness of a stock 
market system with respect to the finance-industry relationship. 
 An important feature of a stock market is that it provides the 
individual investor with more or less ready liquidity.  This is 
usually regarded as a virtue by the exponents of the stock market. 
 As Mr John Tagino, a former head of global equity trading at Merrill 
Lynch put it in relation to the global equities market for leading 
corporations: ` (it) gives the customer the ability to have instant 
liquidity at any time of the day or night, he or she wants it'.
16
 
  However this ` liquidity' also means that the investor need have 
no commitment to the long term future of the firm.  The 
bank-dominated financial systems are by contrast far better able 
to ensure such long term financial commitment to their client 
corporations.  Moreover, unlike the small individual investor in 
a stock market system who has no incentive to gather the costly 
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 Quoted in Cosh, Hughes and Singh [1989]. 
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information to supervise and discipline managers in management 
controlled large corporations, the banks have both the incentive 
and capacity to subject corporate managers to much more stringent 
supervision.  The German-Japanese types of banks are thus able to 
cope far better with the problems of asymmetric information, agency 
costs, transaction costs than the Anglo-Saxon stock market system. 
 
The above discussion raised the question that if  bank-based 
financial  systems have such obvious advantages  over  the 
market-based  systems,  why in the recent period  have  countries 
like  Japan and Germany been liberalising the  financial  systems 
and making them more market - oriented. However, the impetus for 
such liberalisation in countries like Japan and West Germany comes 
from the current imbalances in the world economy and from the US 
political pressure than from the exigencies of economic 
development.  For reasons given above investment and economic 
growth in the hitherto non-stock market economies are more likely 
to be harmed rather than helped by the globalisation and 
liberalisation of financial markets which is presently taking 
place. 
17
 
 
IV. Third World Stock Markets, Volatility, New Issues and Foreign 
Portfolio Investment 
 
                     
    
17
  See further Cosh, Hughes and Singh [1989; Mayer [1988] and 
Frank and Mayer [1990]. 
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Apart from all the problems associated with the finance - industry 
relationships which even well organised stock markets have, most 
third world stock markets are in their infancy.  They tend therefore 
to be shallow; they do not yet have fully developed systems of 
regulation, accounting standards, etc.  Although in all these 
respects, these markets may be expected to improve over time and 
behave more like advanced country stock markets, research suggests 
that they currently display certain special characteristics.  
These will be briefly taken up in this section. 
 
IV.1  Volatility 
Stock market prices tend to fluctuate more than other economic 
variables even in fully developed markets.  However, the high 
degree of volatility is a negative future of stock markets in that 
it can undermine the financial system as a whole; it also makes 
share prices much less useful as a guide to the allocation of 
resources.  Moreover to the extent that they discourage risk-averse 
savers and investors, stock market fluctuations may raise the cost 
of capital to corporations.  After the 1987 stock market crash, 
several enquiries were undertaken in the United States (e.g. the 
Brady Commission) to see whether as a result of financial 
liberalisation and global trading, or the introduction of new 
technology and devices such as programme trading, stock market 
volatility on the U.S. market has increased, and how in any case 
it can be reduced.  Evidence however indicates that volatility on 
the US market in the 1980s has been much in line with the long term 
historical record; it has in fact been less in the last decade than 
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in the 1930s.  (Schwert, 1989).  Nevertheless it remains a cause 
for concern and several proposals have been put forward to reduce 
share price fluctuations, e.g. suspension of share trading if the 
stock market index falls by more than a specific percentage in a 
trading period. 
 
However the capital markets of developing countries exhibit much 
greater volatility than those of advanced economies.  Singh (1993) 
provides evidence on this issue  for  the 1980's.  His data show, 
for example, that between 1984 to 89, the standard deviations of 
monthly percentage changes in share price on the emerging markets 
were considerably larger than those on the US, the UK or the Japanese 
stock markets. Singh also reports that between 1982 and 1985, share 
prices on the Brazilian stock market rose five fold (in US dollars 
terms); two year later they dwindled to twenty eight per cent of 
their 1985 value.  In the first nine months of 1987, share price 
on the Mexican stock market rose six-fold.  However, following 
Black Monday in October 1987 prices fell to a tenth of their pre 
crash level.  In Taiwan, the largest third world stock market, 
between 1987 and February 1990, the share price index rose by three 
hundred and thirty per cent to reach a peak of 12,600; the index 
then fell to a quarter of its value (3160) by September 1990.
18
   
 
A priori, the reasons for the greater price fluctuations on the 
third world stock markets are not be far to seek. First,  because 
these countries do not as yet have  the accounting standards, or 
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  Financial Times, 20 Sept., 1990 
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possess in sufficient numbers information - gathering and 
disseminating private firms or public organisations  of  kind 
found in developed countries,  the  share prices  in these 
emerging markets are likely to be  dominated  by `noise'  and 
speculation.  Second, the fact that not many  listed companies  in 
these young markets will have a long  enough  track record, or 
sufficient time to establish reputations, will tend to produce 
market volatility and arbitrary prices.   
 
IV.2  New Issues and Equity Financing 
 
It was seen earlier that equity financing makes a very small 
contribution to the growth of corporations in the advanced countries 
- because of takeovers, in the US, and the UK, the equity market's 
net contribution to financing of corporate growth has in fact been 
negative in recent years.  However up to now very little information 
has been available on the patterns of corporate finance in 
developing countries.  In the first study of its kind, Singh and 
Hamid (1992) have analysed corporate  financial structures in nine 
developing countries over the period 1980-1988.  The countries 
studied included: South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Pakistan, India, 
Turkey, Mexico, Jordan and Zimbabwe.  Singh and Hamid's sample 
frame was the 50 largest  manufacturing firms quoted on the stock 
markets in each of these countries. 
 
This research revealed some very important differences in the 
financing of corporate growth in the developed and the developing 
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countries.  Unlike the advanced country corporations, firms in 
developing countries were found to use external finance to a far 
larger extent.  For example, the median Korean corporation among 
the top 50 financed nearly 90 per cent of its growth from external 
sources in the 1980s; the corresponding figure for the median 
Mexican, Thai and Turkish corporations was, in each case, more than 
80 per cent.  These are extremely high percentages relative to  
the experience of developed countries.  Secondly, and equally 
significantly, in more than half the countries in the Singh and 
Hamid sample, the top corporations used much more equity, rather 
than debt, to finance the growth of their net assets in the last 
decade.  The largest quoted Jordanian firms financed more than 50 
percent of their growth from equity issues and the biggest Turkish 
firms over 60 percent.  Although the median South Korean company 
used relatively more debt than equity, more than 40 percent of its 
growth was financed by equity. These surprisng results with respect 
to the pattern of corporate financing in industrialised economies 
have been confirmed in Singh's [1995] subsequent study which is 
based on a much larger data set. 
 
Thus in the developing countries today, with many of them enjoying 
a stock market boom in recent years, new issues seem to be a genuine 
source of finance for corporate expansion.  However, the important 
question is whether the development or the expansion of the stock 
markets in these economies has led to an increase in aggregate 
savings or that it simply represents the substitution of one form 
of saving (say bank saving or government bonds) for another 
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(purchase of corporate shares in the stock market).  There is little 
no evidence of an increase in aggregate savings for most developing 
countries as a result of greater new issue activity on the stock 
market.  In some of the countries (e.g. Mexico, Turkey,) the 
aggregate savings actually fell during the 1980s.  Even if 
aggregate savings do not rise in a country, for reasons outlined 
in the forgoing sections, it could be argued that the stock market 
is still useful in so far as it leads to a more efficient allocation 
of these savings or to better corporate performance as a result 
of stock market exposure.  There is no evidence in the developing 
countries on the latter issue although as seen earlier the results 
of the research from advanced countries on the operations of the 
market for corporate control are far from reassuring.  With respect 
to more efficient allocation of savings, the high volatility of 
share prices on the developing countries stock markets and the 
apparent domination of many of these markets by speculators, does 
not augur well for this hypothesis either. 
 
It has sometime been suggested that since the developing countries 
have regulated financial systems, speculation in the stock markets 
act as release valve that in a free system will be expressed 
elsewhere.  However for all its faults, it is better to allow 
speculation in gold or real estate than in corporate shares which 
concern an economy's directly productive potential.  Moreover to 
the extent that it is thought necessary for the government to cater 
to the tastes of speculators, it is better to provide them with 
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a lottery than a stock market where the underlying assets are nothing 
less than the country's industrial present and future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV.3  Foreign Portfolio Investment 
 
As noted in the introduction, the WIDER Study Group has strongly 
argued the case for the abolition of exchange control in developing 
countries, for the encouragement of third world stock markets and 
for their opening up to foreign investors in order to attract 
portfolio investment. The group assume that because of the debt 
crisis, further capital flows from banks to developing countries 
on a voluntary basis are unlikely for many years.  They however, 
foresee a great potential in foreign equity investment.  The main 
reasons for their optimism on this score are the very large and 
rapidly increasing assets of the pension funds ,insurance companies 
and  other institutional investors in the advanced countries and 
their need for portfolio diversification.   
 
The Study Group are right in their belief of the considerable scope 
for foreign portfolio investments in developing countries.  Until 
now, there has generally been low correlation between share prices 
in the third world and advanced country stock markets; for some 
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of the emerging markets the correlations have been negative during 
the period 1984-89.
19
 This  makes  investment  in third 
world  markets  attractive  for pension  funds  and  other 
institutional  investors  in  advanced economies for portfolio 
diversification and risk spreading.   
 
Nevertheless,  as  suggested  in the  analysis  of  the earlier 
sections there is a serious negative side to  the  Study Group's 
 proposals to which they seem not to have given sufficient  
attention.   To  briefly  recapture the main  points, first  the 
 abolition of capital controls will make the national economy much 
more vulnerable both to international macro-economic fluctuations 
as  well  as  to  capital  flight.   Further,  in view  of   the 
destabilising  feedbacks between the financial and the  currency 
markets,  it will make the task of exchange rate management,  and 
hence  of inflation, much more difficult. Secondly, stock  market 
volatility could  "ceteris-paribus" also adversly affect aggregate 
investment  in  the economy. In addition, for  reasons  explained 
earlier stock market development may damage industry -  financial 
relationships  and harm investment, competitiveness and the  real 
economy. Thirdly, if the Study Group's proposals  are  adopted, 
most  of  this portfolio investment is likely to go  to  a  small 
number  of the most developed third world economies  with  large 
corporations and relatively well organised stock markets  rather 
than to a majority of the poor countries. The  Study Group argue 
that fostering stock  market  development will  among  other 
                     
    
19
  See also Cosh, Hughes and Singh [1989]; IMF[1989]. 
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things discourage capital flight and  in  fact bring flight capital 
back since the market gives wealth holders an attractive 
alternative  vehicle for domestic  investment.   This argument 
is  plausible but deceptive.  This is  because  capital flight 
is  essentially  a consequence of  financial  and  macro economic 
instability; of course in turn it also exacerbates  such 
instability.  The existence of a stock market per se is  unlikely 
to  help in this respect. In unstable economic conditions,  stock 
 
market  volatility  on  the  contrary  could  enhance   financi
al instanbility  and  in fact lead to capital 
flight  not  least  by foreign portfolio investors.  
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
Essentially this paper suggests that it is arguable that even  in 
advanced  countries  with  well 
functioning  markets,  the  stock markets more likely do more harm 
than good to the real  economy. 
The  supposed  positive  contributions  of  the  stock   market
s (encouragements of savings, more efficient 
allocation  investment 
resources,  the  discipline  of  corporate  managements   throu
gh competitive  selection in the market for corporate 
control),  for 
all  the  reasons  discussed  earlier,  do  not  materialise   
in practice.   The  market for 
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corporate  control  encourages  large companies to expand through 
takeovers rather than to seek organic growth which promotes economic 
development.  Moreover, it is  not at  all  clear that the 
takeover selection process leads  to  the survival  of firms which 
are  efficient at creating  real  wealth rather than being simply 
skilled in financial engineering.  
 
These  unfavourable  aspects of the  stock  market  are likely to 
be particularly important in third world countries with 
undeveloped  stock markets and high volatility of  share  prices. 
 Therefore,  to the extent that developing countires today have 
a choice they should atempt to foster bank-based financial systems 
 more  along  the lines of the 'follower' countries (Japan, 
Germany,  France)  rather than to establish and encourage stock 
markets.  Historically,  these bank-based systems have  a proven 
record of successfully promoting industrial development in  these 
countries.  Moreover, as we have seen earlier, the modern  theory 
of  information provides strong theoretical reasons for banks to 
be  on the whole more suitable vehicles for achieving these  ends 
than  the  stock  market.  The ordinary 
shareholder  of  a  large corporation  has neither the ability nor 
the incentive  to  obtain the necessary information (which is 
costly) to monitor management activities, thus leading him or her 
to eschew "commitment" to the organization  and to prefer 
liquidity. The  banks, on the  other and,  have  both  the means 
and the incentive  to  collect  such information and to take a long 
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term view of firms' prospects -  a perspective  which is vital for 
industrialization  in  developing economies.  
Notwithstanding  these  extremely important advantages  of 
bank-based  financial systems, it would be a misake not to learn 
from the  experience of the last two decades when, in many 
developing countries, such systems have performed far from 
adequately. In a number  of  developing countries experiencing a 
high  degree  of macro-economic  instability,  bank-based 
finance  has  tended  to degenerate  into  inflationary/ 
inefficient   finance.   Experience syggests  the  following to 
be the most serious  shortcomings  of such systems in the 
developing country context: 
 
(a)  "crony  capitalism", which 
finances  schemes  of  particular individuals and families with 
political connections, rather  than promote long term industrial 
development; 
 
(b)   industry-finance  links  of  the  bank-based  type  can  
in 
principle,  and  sometimes  in  practice,  lead  to  monopolist
ic positions  in  product  markets and thwart 
entry  by  new  firms, therby hindering efficient industrial 
development; 
 
(c)   imprudent or inadequate government regulations of the banks 
has  sometimes jeopardized the integrity of the financial  system 
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as a whole (for example Chile, following financial liberalization 
in the early 1980's). 
 
Thus  although  bank-based systems are much to  be  preferred  in 
principle  to  the  stockmarket-based  systems,  the   developi
ng countries  should pay particular attention to quesions 
of  proper  regulation  and  to the prevention of monopolistic 
abuse  by  the 
banks. 
 
However,  to  be  realistic,  it  must  be  recognised  that the 
stockmarkets in developing countries are today a part of the  new 
economic  landscape and notwithstanding their dubious  merits  in 
relation  to  economic development, they are there to  stay.  The 
question,  therefore, arises how, if at all, can  their  negative 
features  be  contained 
?  The  analysis  of  previous   sections suggests  that from the 
perspective of economic  development,  an 
important  general  policy principle  for the LDCs  should  be to 
 attempt  to  insulate  as far as  possible  the  real industrial 
 economy from the influence of the stock market.  In this context, 
 the   following  kinds  of  policy  proposals require   careful 
consideration  by  developing country 
governments.   First,  they should  examine schemes of taxation 
to reduce share  turnover  as was mooted by keynes and has more 
recently been proposed by Tobin in relation to transactions on the 
international currency markets. Secondly, the developing countries 
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should be seriously  concerned  about the effects of a prospective 
market for corporate  control. Since stockmarkets in these 
countries are still in their  infancy, most  of  them  do not yet 
have an active  market  for  corporate control (although some 
takeover bids on the Indian  Stockmarkets have been reported in 
the most recent period).  However, as  the stockmarkets become more 
mature and more firmly established, left to  itself,  the 
development of a corporate  control.   This  may involve  for 
example major changes in company law,  reducing  the role  of 
shareholders and enhancing that of the stake-holders  or 
the  government in takeover situations.  Some of these  proposals 
in relation to the market for corporate control in the UK and the 
US are examined in singh (1993). 
 
Thirdly  to  the  extent 
that  institutional  investors  such  as pension funds are public 
agencies which appears to be the case in 
many  developing  countries, the governments could  use  them to 
maintain  more orderly markets.  Fourthly, and  importantly, the 
governments  should  encourage  product  market  competition to 
discipline  corporations rather than to rely on the stock market 
for  this purpose.  If a developing country possesses or is  able 
to  establish  a  German-Japanese  type  financial system,  such 
discipline  would  be  supplemented by  the  bank monitoring  of 
corporations.  To reduce the negative aspects of the role of  the 
stock market would require a full exploration of the policy areas 
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outlined  above  in relation to the specific circumstances  of  a 
particular country. 
    
